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Abstract
The focus of this paper is on the presence of economies of scale in administering pension funds.
We make use of a unique dataset with extensive information on South African retirement funds from
1996 to 2006. For almost ￿fty years now, South Africa has operated under a system with small social
security bene￿ts but with considerable options and freedom to long-term savers. The dataset contains
aggregate information for various fund types, fund classes, as well as di⁄erent bene￿t structures.
Estimates of a translog cost function provide evidence of unused economies of scale in the industry.
We also ￿nd that established funds have a substantial cost-advantage over young funds.
JEL Codes: G23, H55, L13
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11 Introduction
Since the mid-1990, many Western countries have adopted measures to shift their pension system towards
de￿ned-contribution (DC) occupational schemes, and away from expensive pay-as-you-go (PAYG) state
pensions. These reforms are intended to address challenging demographic and economic conditions in the
form of population ageing and skyrocketing public indebtedness. The pension structures that are emerging
involve a greater reliance on private sector provision, and call on individuals to bear more of the investment
risk. In counterpart, these changes should bring substantially higher rates of return than PAYG plans, and
consequently they should provide higher bene￿ts during retirement (see Feldstein and Ranguelova, 2001).
One important issue for policymakers and practitioners has been the lack of comprehensive studies
of international experiences with DC-dominated pension system. Part of the uncertainty pertains to the
consequences of the individuals newly found freedom. For example, it is unclear how shifting the decisions
on annuitization back to fund-participants will a⁄ect operating expenses.1 While theories of ￿nancial
intermediation root the existence of pension funds to the presence of ￿xed transaction costs (Freixas and
Rochet, 1999), they o⁄er few insights regarding which pension system is superior to achieve scale economies.
We contribute to the literature by documenting the South African experience.
This article examines economies of scale in pension administration in South Africa, and the role of
plan design. For almost ￿fty years now, South Africa has operated under a pension system with small
social security bene￿ts but with considerable options and freedom for long-term savers. For instance, it is
one of few countries in the world that allow fund-participants complete ￿ exibility regarding annuitization
decisions (Antolin and Stewart, 2008). For the majority of people, membership in a pension fund is not
compulsory except in occupations where such a fund exists. Hence, occupational funds are the primary re-
tirement vehicle for workers in the country. Other ways to accumulate long-term savings include individual
retirement annuity policies and mutual fund products which enjoy similar tax deductions as occupational
retirement funds. Section 2 presents an overview of the retirement industry in South Africa.
Administrative e¢ ciency is a key objective for any pension system. In fact, high administrative costs
can absorb the di⁄erence in rates of return between de￿ned contribution (DC) and PAYG pension plans.
In the case of de￿ned bene￿t funds (DB), high administrative costs can reduce retirement income, and
impoverish the sponsor as well. In South Africa, annual administrative expenses typically lie between
1In this paper, we will use ￿annuitisation￿ and ￿payout options￿ as synonyms to describe how members receive their
bene￿t on retirement.
20.37% and 0.73% of pension fund assets per year in 2003 (Rusconi, 2004). It corresponds to between 6%
and 12% of total annual contributions. The question we address is whether least-cost provision of pension
services is achieved by having relatively fewer, but larger pension funds.
We make use of a unique dataset with extensive information on pension funds from 1996 to 2006. The
dataset contains aggregate information for various types and classes of fund, as well as di⁄erent bene￿t
structures. Our results show that there are between 25%-30% of unused scale economies in the pension
fund industry. However, the potential to reduce costs has been increasing over time. We also ￿nd that
established funds have a substantial cost-advantage over young funds. We attribute this result to learning
by doing gains through experience in the industry, as well as a higher concentration among old funds. This
result is important to the extent that there is scope for funds to improve e¢ ciency over time through both
accumulate knowledge and experience from learning about individuals￿behaviors. This dimension is new
to countries that recently moved to DC pension systems. To the best of our knowledge this e⁄ect is not
acknowledged in the literature.
The literature on economies of scale in the South African pension fund industry is scarce. A notable
exception is the work of Rusconi, presented in October 2004 at the Convention of Actuarial Society of
South Africa. The main focus of this study is to elicit the cost for members of their retirement funding,
and to compare it with other countries. Rusconi (2004) also ￿nds evidence of a strong scale e⁄ect in
administering retirement funds. However, this study su⁄ers from serious data limitations, as it relies solely
on a cross-section of a small sample of pension funds (242 funds covering a total of 127,450 members). The
present study departs from Rusconi (2004) in several ways. First, the dataset used is more representative of
the industry as it contains all the funds that report to the regulatory agency. Second, the data are available
for a longer period. Third, given the richness of the dataset we are able to use a more robust technique to
estimate the cost function of the industry. More speci￿cally, our methodology is closely related to Bikker
and Dreu (2009), who studied the e¢ ciency of the Dutch pension funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our data set. The methodology
and the results come in section 4 and section 5, respectively. We conclude in section 6.
32 Overview of the retirement industry in South Africa
The early history of pension savings in South Africa coincides with that of the insurance industry. Life
insurance policies had long been the main way to accumulate long term savings in the country. The oldest
life insurer still in action ￿The South African Mutual Life Assurance Society, today￿ s Old Mutual was
founded in 1846 (Falkena et al., 1986). It was only in 1956 that the Pension Funds Act was promulgated
to de￿ne the activities of pension funds as opposed to the business of insurers. The Act was amended
subsequently, including in 2001 so as to make new provision for the apportionment of actuarial surpluses
and for minimum bene￿ts; and to provide for matters related therewith.
Based on the OECD taxonomy, the South African pension system can be decomposed into three tiers.
The ￿rst tier is constituted essentially of a means-tested social assistance scheme called State Old Age
Grant (SOAG). The SOAG seeks to alleviate poverty among the older population, by targeting individuals
with no income in retirement. In 2008, as many as 2.23 millions individuals received a grant under this
arrangement. It is reminiscent of the high level of poverty in the country.2 The second tier exists only for
civil servants; this is the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), which is a de￿ned-bene￿t (DB)
fully funded system.
Finally, the third tier is constituted of both occupational pension schemes as well as private retirement
savings schemes. Participation to a retirement scheme is not mandatory in South Africa but individuals
are provided with tax concessions to accumulate capital through various arrangements.3 Membership in
a pension fund is only obligatory in occupations where such a fund exists. This segment of the retirement
system is well developed, but it has a limited coverage of the employed population. For instance, in 2005
only 48% or 5.9 million of the total working population were member of a retirement fund. Funds in this
segment are supervised by the Financial Service Board (FSB).
The focus of this paper is on the third tier. In 2007, there were about 13,000 retirement funds in South
Africa, of which an estimated 4,000 were dormant funds. There is a broad variety of schemes within this
segment of the retirement system. An elementary classi￿cation of schemes in South Africa distinguishes
2In 2004, more than 34% of the population was living with less than $2 a day.
3Pension bene￿ts are taxed as earned income. A portion of lump-sum bene￿ts at retirement is tax-exempt. The tax-free
portion is one-tenth of the highest 5 consecutive years average annual salary (with a maximum of R60,000) times years of
membership (with a maximum of 50 years taken into account). This tax-free amount is limited to the greater of R120,000 or
R4,500 times years of membership. The remaining portion of the lump sum is taxed as earned income.
4between provident funds and pension funds. The main distinction pertains to how the member receives
its bene￿t on retirement. A pension fund provides at least two-third of the pension bene￿ts as a monthly
income until the member dies, and the remaining portion is paid out as a lump-sum. A provident fund, on
the other hand, pays out the entire bene￿t as a lump-sum when the member leaves the fund. Provident
funds represent a larger fraction of active funds than pension funds. Retirement annuity funds o⁄er
additional payout options.
Retirement funds are classi￿ed as private or underwritten funds. Underwritten funds can only invest
in insurance policies, while private funds are permitted to invest in any assets subject to the provisions
of the Pension Funds Act. Smaller companies and the self-employed will generally have an underwritten
fund as primary retirement vehicle, while the employed will use it as a secondary retirement vehicle. Until
2005, underwritten funds were not required to report to the FSB, therefore avoiding signi￿cant costs. In
2007, more than 80% of funds in the third tier had fewer than 50 members, and tended to be underwritten
funds.
Despite the limited coverage of the working population, the retirement industry constitutes the most
important (domestic) source of capital for the economy. In 2005, for instance, the total net assets of the
industry was about 80% of the GDP, that is R1.284 trillion.4
3 Data
The data for this study have been made available by the FSB. They are drawn from the pool of pen-
sion funds falling under its regulatory responsibility during the period 1996 to 2006. It gives a detailed
breakdown of administrative expenses, membership, as well as contributions and bene￿ts to the fund.
Information about the fund type, fund class, fund status, bene￿t structure and level of assets are also
available.5
Our working sample consists of 13,652 data points. The dataset is an unbalanced panel as the industry
recorded new entries, mergers or closures over the period of the study. We do not include underwritten
funds as they only started reporting to the FSB in 2005. Excluding underwritten funds eliminates most of
4On the 18 November 2010, 1 euro = 9.5 Rand.
5However, the data is likely to have some drawbacks. The lack of uniformity in the measurement/classi￿cation of some
costs among funds can be a problem. In addition, the costs incurred by the sponsoring employer in support of the employees￿
pension fund are not always passed on to the fund.
5Table 1: Administrative costs by size (2006)
Variables Administrative Administrative Total assets Total number Number of
expenses/total expenses per per member of members pension funds
assets (%) member (1,000 Rand) (1,000)
Number of members
0-100 1.63 3,065 443 19 409
100-1,000 0.94 1,127 265 264 702
1,000-10,000 0.64 626 250 821 298
10,000-100,000 0.59 386 236 1,078 44
>100,000 2.24 76 4 1,181 5
Average/total 1.21 1,056 239 3,363 1,458
Total assets (million Rand)
0-10 2.10 3,049 252 32 271
10-1,00 0.80 2,450 457 351 684
1,00-1,000 0.38 1,331 438 1,368 415
1,000-10,000 0.24 855 610 1,236 79
>10,000 0.08 428 508 376 9
Average/total 0.72 1,623 453 3,363 1,458
Source: Auhtors￿calucaltion based on FSB data.
the small (and potentially ine¢ cient) pension funds, and creates a selection bias. The exercise conducted
in this paper, however, informs the ￿best practice￿in South Africa.
Table 1 reports the (weighted) average of administrative costs for di⁄erent size categories in 2006, as
proxied by the number of members and the level of assets, respectively. A couple of points are worth
stressing about Table 1. First, notice that as the fund size increases the average administrative expenses
per member decreases sharply. When the fund size is captured by the number of members, the average
administrative expenses per member goes from R3,065 for funds with fewer than 100 members, to R76 for
funds with more than 100,000 members. When using total assets to measure the fund size, the average
administrative costs per member was R3,049 for funds with less than 100 million Rand of total assets
compared to R428 for retirement funds with more than 100 billion Rand worth of assets.
Secondly, on average the administrative expenses per rand of asset decreases signi￿cantly across total
asset categories, from 2.10% for the smallest retirement funds to 0.08% for the largest ones. The negative
relationship between average administrative costs over total assets and fund size is con￿rmed across cate-
gories of total members. The only exception is the largest category, which displays the highest percentage
at 2.24%; but it cannot be dissociated from the fact that the level of total assets per member appears to
6Table 2: Administrative costs by type and by class of fund, and by bene￿t structure (2006)
Variables Administrative Administrative Total assets Total number Number of Average
expenses/total expenses per per member of members pension funds number of
assets (%) member (1,000 Rand) (1,000) members
Type of pension fund
Ordinary 1.05 2,392 422 2,807 1,325 2,119
Preservation 1.02 4,104 575 18 22 811
Umbrella 2.17 1,232 146 537 111 4,841
Average/total 1.41 2,576 381 3,363 1,458 2,590
Class of fund
Pension 0.96 2,524 494 1,682 771 2,182
Provident 1.35 2,115 301 1,664 671 2,480
Retirement annuity 0.60 1,952 334 16 16 1,014
Average/total 0.97 2,197 376 3,363 1,458 1,892
Bene￿t structure
De￿ned bene￿t 0.88 5,323 942 625 235 2,659
De￿ned contribution 1.215 1,680 289 2,583 1,166 2,215
Hybrid 0.61 2,331 535 138 38 3,628
Average/total 0.90 3,105 589 3,346 1,439 2,834
Source: Auhtors￿calucaltion based on FSB data.
be extremely low for this category of retirement funds. The analysis of these descriptive statistics suggests
the presence of important economies of scale in the pension fund industry.
In Table 2, we break down administrative expenses for various fund types and classes, as well as for
di⁄erent bene￿t structures. Notice the dominance of DC funds with a total of 1,166 funds and more than
75% of total members. Unlike the other fund types, more than one employer can participate in an umbrella
fund. Thus, there is scope for scale economies in terms of reporting costs with this type of arrangement.
This is apparent in the average expenses per member in our sample. For members in an umbrella fund
the average administrative expenses were R1,232 in 2006 compared to more than R2,392 for individuals
in ordinary funds or in preservation funds. However, the ratio of administrative costs per total assets of
umbrella funds is the highest among the three types of fund at 2.17%.
On average, less money is spent per member to administer provident funds compared to pension funds.
It is to be expected as provident funds pay out the entire bene￿t as a cash lump-sum when a member
leaves the fund, thereby stopping administration at retirement. Pension funds, on the other hand, o⁄er a
monthly pension income in addition to making a lump-sum payment. However, administrative expenses
over total assets is higher for provident funds at 1.35% in 2006 compared to 0.96 for pension funds. This is
7in part explained by the fact that the concentration of provident funds is highest in the blue-collar segment
of the working population, particularly industry and union funds. Thus, it is not clear whether provident
funds enjoy some sort of advantage.
Retirement annuity funds, on the other hand, enjoy the lowest administrative expenses both per member
and per total assets. This outcome is surprising, because retirement annuity funds collect contributions
via direct debit from each member￿ s bank account; one would have expected this to be more expensive
than leveraging o⁄ payroll systems, as both occupational pension and provident funds do. The level of
aggregation in our dataset is too high to fully account for the singularity of each fund type as there exists a
wide variety of products among pension, provident and annuity funds; and this is also true for the bene￿t
structure.
4 Methodology
To examine economies of scale in pension administration we exploit the variation in our data for two
samples: the overall South African retirement industry and the group of funds that report to the FSB
continuously over a period of 11 years (henceforth ￿11-year funds￿ ). Two reasons justify looking at the
￿11-year funds￿ . First, in order to overcome data issues caused by misreporting. Second, the latter group
probably gives a more accurate representation of the e¢ ciency of the pension fund industry. Both their
longevity and their ability to report regularly suggest that they have an ￿absolute cost-advantage￿which
allows them to survive entry and competition in the industry (see Tirole, 1988 pp. 306). They account
for approximately a third of the members in the full sample. Only one the four biggest funds (more than
100,000 members) in number of members is part of this sub-sample. However, eight out of nine of the
biggest funds in total assets (more than R10 trillions) belong to the ￿11-year funds￿sub-sample.
The cost function of the typical retirement fund is modeled as a translog function. The translog
function embodies the notion that expenses are expected to vary with two outputs, investment activities
and services to participants in the pension plan. This formulation is often used to identify scale e⁄ects
(see for example Mitchell and Andrews, 1981). We postulate the following linear form:
lnCostit = ￿0 + ￿1 lnMembersit + ￿3Assets +
X
j
￿jXjit + "it (1)
where Cost is the fund￿ s administrative expenses, Members is the total number of participants in the
fund which we use as our scale variable in order to focus on service activities to participants. Assets
8is level of assets per member. Xj is a set of control variables, and the error term is represented by ".
Included in the vector Xj are fund characteristics, other than size, that may a⁄ect costs (fund type,
bene￿t structure, membership repartition between pensioners, bene￿ciaries, etc ...). Eq (1) will serve as
the basis of multivariate regressions.
The presence of economies of scale is captured by the coe¢ cient ￿1. When ￿1 is less than one, the
industry operates below the constant-returns-to-scale value of one and there are potential e¢ ciency gains
to be made from increasing pension fund size. When ￿1 is greater than one, the industry operates with
decreasing returns to scale.
We also allow scale economies to vary with the fund size by introducing a squared term into Eq:(1).
This speci￿cation is useful to determine the ￿optimal￿fund size.
lnCostit = ￿0 + ￿1 lnMembersit + ￿2 (lnMembersit)
2 + ￿3Assets +
X
j
￿jXjit + "it (2)
We estimate the linear models in Eq (1) and Eq (2) using two techniques. First, we run an OLS of the
system of independent equations to estimate the e⁄ect of size and plan design on administrative expenses.
We control for time ￿xed e⁄ects. Second, we run the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique
(Zellner, 1962). The SUR technique is more appropriate to account for the cross-equation restrictions as
well as the pooled cross-sectional and time series nature of our data. Using the SUR technique in STATA
requires a balanced-panel; only the ￿11-year funds￿sub-sample ￿ts this requirement (see Figure 2).6
5 Results
In this section, we look to ￿nd more support for the presence of a size e⁄ect in the pension fund industry
in South Africa. We run several regressions based on Eq:(1) and Eq:(2) for the overall South African
retirement industry and for the ￿11-year funds￿ , respectively. The estimates for the administrative costs
model are presented in Table 3. In the regression, the reference categories are: ordinary, pension, de￿ned
contribution, for fund type, fund class and bene￿t structure, respectively.
For the full sample, the fund size explain 59% of the variation in administrative expenses. The scale
coe¢ cient ￿1 is signi￿cantly lower than one.7 In other words, increasing the number of members will
6The results with the SUR technique are available upon request. All our (qualitative) ￿ndings are robust to the use of
the SUR technique.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10increase administrative costs by less than proportionally. Based on the linear model (￿rst column), there
exists as much as 30% of unused scale economies in the pension fund industry in South Africa. In other
words, a 1% increase in the number of members, holding assets constant, would raise administrative
expenses by only 0.696%. For comparison, Bikker et al. (2010) estimate the scale coe¢ cient for Australia
(0.739), Canada (0.945), the Netherlands (0.691) and the United Sates (0.788). Their study also excludes
small funds so that the scale coe¢ cients are comparable to our ￿nding.
For the sub-sample of ￿11-year funds￿ , the scale coe¢ cient is higher, as one would have expected, at
0.758 (third column). Moreover the R-squared of the regression is increased from 0.59 to 0.68.8 It seems
that established funds are enjoying a substantial advantage that make them cheaper than ￿recent￿pension
funds. This result is robust to the the period funds appear in the dataset (see for example Figure 3 in
the Appendix). We interpret this result as evidence of learning by doing in the industry. In fact, in many
industries learning through production experience or learning by doing enables ￿rms to reduce costs (see
for example Lewis and Yildirim, 2002). Given the long-term nature of the fund-individual relationship,
there is scope for ￿old funds￿to accumulate information relevant to the provision of retirement services.
This feature is more valuable in pension systems that give individuals room to make important decisions
such as assets allocation or annuitization.
The signi￿cance of the squared term in the quadratic model (third column) suggests that economies of
scale in the industry decrease as the retirement fund size increases. Based on the estimate of the quadratic
model, optimal size is obtained at 220,000 members (see Figure 1). For the South African pension system
as a whole, this number is a lower bound because the average pension fund is less e¢ cient than what we
estimated using both sub-samples in this study.
Results for plans design are also informative. First, de￿ned bene￿t plans are found to have one-third
(0.277) higher administrative expenses than both de￿ned contribution plans and hybrid plans. Bateman
and Mitchell (2004) found a similar coe¢ cient for Australia (0.335) which has several similarities with the
South African pension system. Second, provident funds have lower costs than both pension funds and
retirement annuity funds, even after controlling for the level of assets per member. The coe¢ cient of the
provident dummy is signi￿cantly negative in all the regressions. However, the di⁄erence in costs is rather
to scale, while constant returns to scale are obtained when cost elasticities equals one.
8The scale coe¢ cient falls to 0.709 for the sub-sample of funds that reported to the FSB between 9 and 11 years over the
period of the study; and the R-squared of the regression is 0.61.
11Figure 1: Optimal fund size
small between paying out the bene￿ts at retirement as a lump-sum (provident funds) or monthly payment
(pension funds).
Notice that the coe¢ cient on the retirement annuity dummy is relatively high and highly signi￿cant.
That is, after controlling for di⁄erences in fund types, bene￿t structures as well as fund sizes, retirement
annuity funds are relatively expensive options. This result suggests that collection costs are important
to explain the di⁄erent in administrative costs. Third, the analysis for provident funds also applies to
umbrella funds as they also enjoy less administrative expenses on average with a level of assets per member
lower than both ordinary funds and preservation funds. As pointed out in the previous section, umbrella
arrangements generate economies of scale in administration but this might be o⁄set by insu¢ cient scale
economies. A high enough asset level is required to generate economies of scale in the investment activities
of a retirement fund.
5.1 Evolution of scale economies between 1996 and 2006
In Figure 2, we present the evolution of the scale economies over the period 1996 to 2006. The graph






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13Figure 2: Evolution of scale economics (1996-2006)
e¢ cient over the period 1996-2006.
Such e¢ ciency loss can occur as a result of a dilution of market shares, and a reduction of the average
fund size (away from the optimal size). Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman
concentration indices (HHIs) over the period of interest. The label ￿9-11 year funds￿designates the group
of pension funds that are in the dataset for at least 9 years. As expected, consolidation is the highest
among the group of pension funds in the ￿11 year funds￿sub-sample, but this concentration decreases over
the period. This is also the case for the entire industry. Despite a slight movement toward concentration
since 2004, the industry is far from its 1996 level. Thus, it seems that some of the e¢ ciency losses can be
attributed to a fall in the market concentration between 1996 and 2006.
Another reason for the e¢ ciency losses could be a change in the regulation. In 2001, signi￿cant
regulatory changes were introduced that had numerous repercussions on the reporting method to the FSB.
To test this hypothesis within the framework of this study, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 from 2001 onward and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient of the dummy is signi￿cant, that is, changes
that occurred in 2001 explain administrative expenses.
146 Conclusion
This study documents the extent to which e¢ ciency gains can be made in administering pension funds in
South Africa. We ￿nd that:
￿ There are between 25%-30% of unused scale economies in the pension fund industry, with an optimal
fund size at around 220,000 members.
￿ Old funds appears to be more e¢ cient than young funds because of relatively higher market concen-
tration as well as more experience in the industry.
￿ The potential to reduce costs has been increasing over time as we observe a dilution of the market
shares since 2006.
￿ Umbrella arrangements are conducive of economies of scale in administration expenses but not nec-
essarily in investment activities.
￿ Collection costs are important to explain high administrative costs.
The issue of the presence of economies of scale in the pension fund industry is of concern in determining
appropriate regulatory policy toward fund creation, acquisitions and mergers, as well as in predicting future
industry structure. Since economies of scale exist in the industry, least-cost provision of pension services
would be accomplished by having relatively fewer, but larger pension funds. Competitive market forces
have not contribute to further consolidation of pension funds. Thus, one way to achieve least cost provision
is for the regulator to implement policies (such as an entry fee) so that only larger and more cost-e¢ cient
funds are left. Additional research is needed in order to account for each industry speci￿city.
In addition, the non-compulsory nature of the South African pension system is more likely to make it
more expensive. Additional costs include marketing costs by providers, an additional need for underwriting,
or more scope for anti-selection.9
9That is, individuals with longer life expectancy are more likely to purchase annuities.
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Variables Administrative Administrative Total assets Total number Number of
expenses/total expenses per per member of members pension funds
assets (%) member (1,000 Rand) (1,000)
Number of members
0-100 1.02 3,678 629 5 102
100-1,000 0.66 1,165 307 90 220
1,000-10,000 0.35 500 327 297 108
10,000-100,000 0.16 413 374 535 19
>100,000 0.48 25 5 228 1
Average/total 0.53 1,156 328 1,155 450
Total assets (million Rand)
0-10 1.54 4,773 341 3 38
10-1,00 0.70 3,050 606 65 211
1,00-1,000 0.28 1,011 442 263 156
1,000-10,000 0.13 749 688 469 37
>10,000 0.09 463 494 356 8
Average/total 0.55 2,009 514 1,155 450
Source: Auhtors￿calucaltion based on FSB data.
17Table 6: Administrative costs fund type, fund class, and by bene￿t structure for ￿11-year funds￿(2006)
Variables Administrative Administrative Total assets Total number Number of Average
expenses/total expenses per per member of members pension funds number of
assets (%) member (1,000 Rand) (1,000) members
Type of pension fund
Ordinary 0.65 2,383 510 1,103 435 2,536
Preservation 0.37 853 319 0 2 161
Umbrella 0.67 703 156 52 13 3,979
Average/total 0.56 1,313 329 1,155 450 2,225
Class of fund
Pension 0.58 2,356 594 840 234 3,590
Provident 0.72 2,288 398 310 213 1,455
Retirement annuity 0.76 2,970 308 5 3 1,770
Average/total 0.69 2,538 433 1,155 450 2,272
Bene￿t structure
De￿ned bene￿t 0.50 4,808 1,050 384 91 4,222
De￿ned contribution 0.70 1,477 331 648 336 1,929
Hybrid 0.41 1,897 671 121 18 6,708
Average/total 0.53 2,727 684 1,153 445 4,286
Source: Auhtors￿calucaltion based on FSB data.
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